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Abstract: Sydney Harbour Bridge is a key transport infrastructure that connects 
North Sydney and Sydney Central Business District (CBD). To alleviate the 
congestion on Sydney Harbour Bridge, NSW Roads and Maritime Services imposes 
a time of day tolling between $2.5 and $4 on the southbound traffic to Sydney CBD. 
This study develops mathematical models for formulating the toll pricing problem on 
Sydney Harbour Bridge considering that different travellers may have different 
value-of-times (VOTs). The models examine quantitatively the effect of different toll 
levels on the efficiency (in terms of the total generalized travel time and generalized 
travel cost of all travellers) and equity (in terms of the ratio of generalized travel cost 
among different traveller classes). The proposed models can serve as a useful 
decision-support tool for NSW Roads and Maritime Services. 
Key words: Toll pricing; Traffic equilibrium; Heterogeneous value-of-time; 
Sydney Harbour Bridge; Optimization. 
 
I. Introduction 
 
In view of the importance of the Sydney Harbour Bridge on transport efficiency in Sydney, this 
paper develops mathematical models for formulating the toll pricing problem on Sydney Harbour 
Bridge considering that different travellers may have different value-of-times (VOTs). The 
models examine quantitatively the effect of different toll levels on the efficiency and equity. The 
objective is to provide a useful decision-support tool for NSW Roads and Maritime Services. 
II. Toll pricing with homogeneous travellers 
 
We assume that there are two roads from North Sydney to CBD of Sydney: one via Sydney 
Harbour Bridge (link ) and the other via other bridges (link ), see Figure 1. Link  is longer 
and has a larger capacity than link . The link travel time functions are assumed to be of the 
Bureau of Public Roads (BPR) form: 
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where 
 is the free-flow travel time (minutes),  (vph) is the traffic flow,  (vph) is the link 
flow capacity, and  	 0 and  	 1 are two parameters. 
 
We represent by  (vph) the travel demand from North Sydney to Sydney CBD, and we 
denote by  and  the flow on link a and b, respectively. The link flow must satisfy flow 
conservation equations. For simplicity, we define a set: 
 ( ){ }, | , 0, 0a b a b a bv v v v q v vΩ= + = ≥ ≥  (2) 
containing all the possible link flow vector   ,     Ω. 
 
1 2 20,a av v q> =1 0bv >
0.63aτ <
2 2
av q=1 1bv q=
0.63 1.88a≤ τ ≤
2 0av >1 1 2, 0b bv q v= >
1.88aτ >  
Figure 1. Transport flow with different tolls. 
 
A. User equilibrium, system optimum, and optimal toll pricing 
Since each traveller aims to minimize her/his travel time, at the user equilibrium (UE), if no 
toll is imposed, the travel times on the two links are identical   . We assume that 
all travelers are homogeneous with value of time (VOT)  ($/min). If the government imposes 
toll on both links denoted by   , , the equilibrium is: 
 ( ) ( )a a a b b bt v t vγ + τ = γ + τ  (3) 
We can compute the resulting link flow  and  denoted by 
 . 
 
 
At system optimum (SO), the total travel time of all road users is minimized, and the SO link 
flow is denoted by . The optimal SO toll denoted by  can be computed by the marginal 
social cost theory. Alternatively, the government may impose a non-zero toll on only one link by 
requiring that: 
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 { }* * *min ,a a a bτ = τ − τ τ  (4) 
 { }* * *min ,b b a bτ = τ − τ τ  (5) 
B. An example using Sydney Harbour Bridge 
We use the case of Sydney Harbour Bridge to demonstrate the above models. The free-flow 
travel time of Sydney Harbour Bridge is calculated as follows. It is 1.149 km long and we 
assume a free-flow travel speed of 80 km/h. Hence, 
  0.86 min. It has 8 traffic lanes 
controlled by Electronic Lane Changing System (ELCS). Therefore we assume that 6 lanes are 
used in the southbound direction during morning peak. We further assume that the capacity of 
one lane is 2000 vehicles/h. Consequently,   12,000. The coefficients   0.15 and  
2. We assume that the length of link b is 5km, its free-flow travel speed is 80 km/h, and it has 20 
lanes. Therefore, 
  3.75 and   40,000. The coefficients   0.15 and   4. We 
assume  	  because the traffic on Sydney Harbour Bridge is well controlled and regulated. 
We assume that the demand in the peak hour is 120,000 vph. The value of time   0.5 $/min. 
The results are reported in Table 1, where the row “Toll ($4)” means a toll of $4 is charged on 
Sydney Harbour Bridge and the column “TTT” means the total travel time of all travelers as 
defined below: 
 
 ( ) ( )a a a b b bTTT v t v v t v= +  (6) 
 
When $4 is charged (which is the actual toll charge during morning and evening peak hours 
on weekdays), the flow on Sydney Harbour Bridge is 45,050. To achieve the SO traffic flow, the 
optimal toll charge on Sydney Harbour Bridge should be $0.36. The toll charge $4 is apparently 
too high, and the resulting TTT is not only larger than that under SO, but also significantly larger 
than that without any intervention (UE). 
 
 
Table 1. Results with homogeneous travellers. 
 
 av  bv  ( )a at v  ( )b bt v  aτ TTT 
No toll (UE) 69,422 50,578 5.188 5.188 0 622,550 
SO 66,480 53,520 4.829 5.553 0.36c 618,219 
Toll ($4) 45,050 74,950 2.684 10.684 4 921,642 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
c This is the optimal  to achieve SO with   0. 
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III. Toll pricing with heterogeneous travelers 
 
We examine heterogeneous travellers in this section. We consider M traveller classes, and the 
VOT of class m = 1,2,…,M is denoted by ' ($/min). The demand of class m is '. The number 
of travellers from class m on link i is denoted by 
'. For simplicity, we define a set: 
 ( ){ }ˆ , , 1,2 , 0, 0,m m m m m m ma b a b a bv v m M v v q v v mΩ = = + = ≥ ≥ ∀L  (7) 
containing all the possible link flow vector   
', 
', (  1, … , *   Ω+ . 
 
C. User equilibrium, system optimum, and optimal toll pricing 
With heterogeneous travellers, there are two types of SO: SO in cost units and SO in time 
units. The SO model in cost units can be formulated as: 
 
1
min ( ) ( )
M
m m m
a a a b b b
m
v t v v t v
=
 γ + ∑  (8) 
According to Ref. 1, the optimal toll can be computed. 
 
D. An example using Sydney Harbour Bridge 
We look at the Sydney Harbour Bridge example again, and assume two classes: ,  0.25, 
-  0.75, ,  60,000 and -  60,000. Therefore the total demand and the average VOT are 
the same as sub-section II.B. 
The results are reported in Table 2, where the column “Toll ($4)” means a toll of $4 is 
charged on Sydney Harbour Bridge. The column “TTT” means the total travel time of all 
travellers defined by Eq. (6). The column “TTC” means the total travel cost of all travellers 
defined below: 
 
1
( ) ( )
M
m m m
a a a b b b
m
TTC v t v v t v
=
 = γ + ∑  (9) 
We can see that to minimize total travel cost, a toll of $1.92 should be imposed on Sydney 
Harbour Bridge, and only travellers in class 2 use Sydney Harbour Bridge. Both travellers in 
class 1 and class 2 use other bridges, and hence their generalized travel time is the same, and 
their generalized travel cost is proportional to their VOTs. If we minimize the total travel time, 
then slightly fewer people use Sydney Harbour Bridge than the case of no toll (UE). To this end, 
a toll of $0.18 is imposed and therefore all travellers in class 2 use Sydney Harbour Bridge. 
Travellers in class 1 use both links. Since travellers in class 1 and class 2 have the same travel 
time and pay the same toll on Sydney Harbour Bridge, the ratio of the generalized travel cost 
between class 2 and class 1 is reduced from 3 to 2.740. 
 
When a toll of $4 is imposed on Sydney Harbour Bridge, then only travellers in class 2 use it. 
This case is similar to the case of Cost SO and since both travellers in class 1 and class 2 use the 
untolled link, their generalized travel time is identical. 
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Table 2. Results with heterogeneous travellers. 
 No toll (UE) Cost SO Time SO Toll ($4) 
1
av  34,711 0 6,480 0 
2
av  34,711 59,819 60,000 51,531 
1
bv  25,289 60,000 53,520 60,000 
2
bv  25,289 181 0 8,469 
( )a at v  5.188 4.074 4.829 3.245 
( )b bt v  5.188 6.632 5.553 8.579 
aτ  0 1.92
d 0.18e 4 
Generalized time for class 1 5.188 6.632 5.553 8.579 
Generalized time for class 2 5.188 6.632 5.070 8.579 
Generalized cost for class 1 1.297 1.658 1.388 2.145 
Generalized cost for class 2 3.891 4.974 3.803 6.434 
Ratio of cost of class 2 over cost of class 1 3.000 3.000 2.740 3.000 
TTT 662,550 642,824 618,219 754,636 
TTC 311,276 283,153 308,421 308,607 
E. Impact analysis of different toll levels 
We further analyse the flow pattern under different toll levels, and the results are shown in 
Figure 1. When  . 0.63, travelers in class 1 and all travellers in class 2 use Sydney Harbour 
Bridge and experience the same travel time and toll; some travellers in class 1 use other bridges. 
Therefore, the ratio of the generalized travel cost of class 2 and class 1 is between 3 and 2.24 
(less than the ratio of their VOTs). When 0.63 /  / 1.88, all travellers in class 2 use Sydney 
Harbour Bridge and all travellers in class 1 use other bridges. The ratio of the generalized travel 
cost is between 2.24 and 3.00. When  	 1.88, some travellers in class 2 use Sydney Harbour 
Bridge; all travellers in class 1 and the other travellers in class 2 use other bridges. Therefore, on 
link b, the two classes of travellers experience the same travel time and zero tolls. The ratio of 
the generalized travel cost is 3.00. 
 
IV. Conclusions 
 
This paper has developed mathematical models for formulating the toll pricing problem on 
Sydney Harbour Bridge considering that different travellers may have different value-of-times. 
The models examine quantitatively the effect of different toll levels on the efficiency and equity. 
                                                          
d This is the optimal  to achieve Cost SO with   0. 
e This is the optimal  to achieve Cost SO with   0. 
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The proposed models can serve as a useful decision-support tool for NSW Roads and Maritime 
Services. 
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